Archive for the ‘labor market’ Category

Working men are p***ed

29 July 2016

Unemployment at 4.9%. More than 75 straight months of continuous job growth. Per capita GDP at an all-time high. Summer’s here. But nobody’s dancing in the streets.

Here are a couple graphs that may help explain why:

FREDpersYpcapGDP

First, note that even as real per capita GDP continues to reach new peaks, the typical American adult (i.e., the person at the 50th percentile) in 2014 was no better off than in the last two recessions. Median personal income was down about 5% from about a decade ago. The rising tide is clearly not lifting all boats. The more politicians crow about the improving economy and the more economists say we are at “full employment,” the greater the disconnect becomes.

Caveat: Ideally I’d have median personal income data from after 2014. The numbers have likely improved since then. Jared Bernstein notes that real weekly earnings have grown almost 4% since 2014. Whether personal income has had similar growth also depends on employment trends. Which brings me to:

blsEP2554saMF

The above is the US “prime-age” (25-54) employment/population ratio from 1990 to present. The employment/population ratio is about 2 points lower now than then, partly because the standard unemployment rate is about 1 point higher and also because more jobless people are “out of the labor force,” i.e., not actively seeking work. Would they take work if offered it? The Bureau of Labor Statistics report for June suggests many of them would — the alternative unemployment rate including jobless “discouraged workers” and “persons marginally attached to the labor force” is 6.0%. (Add in part-time workers who’d prefer to be full-time and the rate rises to 9.6%. It’s been improving for six years but is still no better than in mid 2008 when we were in a recession.)

What’s really striking to me, and what inspired the title, is the gender breakdown of those prime-age employment/population numbers. (Sorry, the separate BLS graphs for men and women are too messy to use here, but you can Google them.) For women, the employment/population ratio has regained its 1990 level of 71%; for men, the ratio is down about 5 points, to 85%. There’s a story here, probably several. The erosion of male privilege has been a big theme of this year’s political commentary. Without getting into the politics or ethics of that, let’s just note:

  • These graphs indicate that it by no means a new thing, at least in the labor market. The male employment/population ratio has been falling since 1969, when it was 95%. The female employment ratio has been rising steadily since at least the late 1940s, when it was less than half the current level.
  • During the boom decade of the 1990s, the male employment/population ratio fell by about half a point, while the female ratio rose sharply, from 71% to 74.5%.
  • Male employment was hit harder than female employment during the 2008-2009 recession (men’s employment fell from 89% to 81%, women’s from 74.5% to 69%).
  • Men’s employment has actually risen faster than women’s during the post-2009 recovery (ratio up by about 4 points vs. 2 points), but again, the male employment ratio is down about 5 points from 1990, whereas the female employment ratio is unchanged.

 

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Extend those unemployment benefits already

29 December 2013

Yesterday 1.3 million jobless Americans lost their unemployment benefits, thanks to Congress’s unwillingness or inability to extend long-term unemployment insurance funding. The number could rise to 4.9 million within the next year.

Extending the unemployment benefits is a no-brainer at a time when long-term unemployment rates are still higher than in any previous postwar recession, when there are three unemployed people for every job vacancy, and the money paid out in unemployment benefits quickly gets spent, thereby boosting the still-weak economy. Support for the extension is strong among the public, liberal public policy groups, and even some prominent conservatives. But Congressional Republicans continue to block it.

I’ve heard four arguments against extending unemployment benefits beyond the current 26-week threshold.

1. It encourages idleness.

Econ 101 does indeed tell us that, other things equal, anything you do to make people’s unemployment experience more pleasant, like giving them cash, reduces their incentive to take a job. Which is which unemployment benefits normally expire after 26 weeks. But these are not normal times, not with the long-term unemployment rate at 2.6%, a higher level than in any previous recession or recovery since WW2. Yet in all of those other recessions, whenever long-term unemployment got anywhere near this high, unemployment benefits were extended. If you cut off long-term unemployment benefits, some of the long-term jobless would find jobs, but the vast majority would not, unless a million or so vacancies could somehow materialize too and employers suddenly developed a preference for long-time jobless applicants. (Currently employers have a strong preference for applicants who are not unemployed, followed by those who have only been out of work for a short spell.)

A recent empirical study published by the Brookings Institution estimates that in the absence of extended unemployment benefits the unemployment rate would be about 0.1 – 0.5% lower, which we will note that is a small fraction of the current 2.6% long-term jobless rate. And the author notes that about half of that improvement would come not from the long-term unemployed rejoining the work force but from currently employed people sticking with their jobs because of the worsening of the alternative. So the estimate becomes just 0.05% – 0.25% of the long-term jobless who would rejoin the work force if benefits were cut off. Do the math, and the estimated ratio of still-unemployed people without benefits to newly re-employed is in the range of 9-to-1 to 51-to-1. Rather high pain-to-gain ratios.

2. It hurts the long-term unemployed by lengthening their term of unemployment even further, making it even harder for them to find a job.

While it’s true that employers are reluctant to hire the long-term unemployed, this argument makes the same false assumption as in (1.), namely that the jobs are out there and the long-term unemployed just aren’t looking hard enough or aren’t willing to take them. A 3-to-1 unemployed-to-vacancies ratio should give the lie to that. And the ratio of long-term unemployed to vacancies that long-term unemployed people have a realistic shot at is surely much higher.

3. It’s no longer needed, what with the economy’s recent improvement. Real GDP grew 4.1% in the last quarter, and the unemployment rate is down to 7%. 

Those numbers have dominated the recent headlines, but they’re irrelevant here. Thanks to growing productivity, real GDP is now higher than it was before the recession, but with two million fewer workers. And as I seem to write in every post, the standard unemployment rate is largely irrelevant, when millions of jobless Americans have given up looking for work, millions more have left or avoided the labor force entirely, and other millions are involuntarily working part-time because they can’t find full-time work. More relevant numbers are the 13.2% comprehensive (U-6) unemployment rate; the 58.6% employment/population ratio, which has not improved since the depth of the recession; and, of course, the 2.6% rate of long-term (27+ weeks) unemployment as a percentage of the labor force. The economy’s recent good news has largely bypassed the long-term unemployed. The best that can be said about the long-term unemployment rate is that it’s been coming down, from about 4.3% four years ago, but even then it’s still as high as at any point since the 1940s.

4. It costs money.

This is the silliest objection of all, since the amount in question ($24 billion next year) is not only less than 0.7% of the budget, but a lot of the money would be returned to the federal, state, and local government in the form of tax revenues as the unemployed spend that income. Unemployed people can be counted on to spend nearly all of their benefits, especially seeing as the benefits are small compared to their previous income; the benefits level varies by state, with most states in the range of 25-45%. While unemployment benefits cost money, so do food, clothing, shelter, utilities, and all the other necessities and commitments that people have. They’re called benefits because they provide very tangible benefits to the people who receive them, far in excess of their cost to the taxpayers. (And it should be noted that the unemployed already paid into the system when they were working and will do so again if and when they return to work.)

Whatever your opinion on this issue, there should be no doubting that long-term unemployment is one of the central problems of our time. The long-term unemployed are almost 40% of the total unemployed, which is roughly twice as high as in any previous postwar recession (see graph).

L-t-unempl-as-pct-of-total-unempl

While extended unemployment benefits do more good than harm, what we need even more are jobs. Government job creation is a non-starter in Congress and apparently with the public as well, so once again we are left with the Micawber-like hope that something will turn up in the private sector.

 

Special no-prize to the first person who can connect that last line to this video of Keith Richards:

Six years of pain

27 December 2013

Six years ago this month, the US economy officially peaked. We didn’t know it till a year later when NBER made the call, but the labor market has never been the same. The unemployment rate crept upward through the summer of 2008, before exploding that fall and reaching double digits the next fall (up from 4.5% in the first half of 2007), several months after the recession officially ended in June 2009. People call that devastating eighteen months the Great Recession, but I prefer to call this whole six years (and counting) the Little Depression because the economy — and the labor market in particular — remains so depressed.

Consider the change from December 2007 to now (or rather to November 2013, the most recent month we have data for):

The adult (age 16+ population) grew by 13,411,000.

Employment shrunk by 1,887,000.

Unemployment rose by 3,262,000.

“Not in labor force” (neither employed nor actively looking for a job) rose by 12,035,000.*

(*And no, most of that does not come from old people retiring. The drop in the employment/population ratio is 4.1 percentage points if you include all of the adult population, and 3.8 percentage points if you include only those in the 25-54 age range.)

Sometimes the numbers really do speak for themselves.

Declare victory and taper?

19 December 2013

Wednesday the Federal Open Market Committee did the expected, by announcing a “tapering” off of its $85 billion monthly purchases of long-term Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS’s), citing “the cumulative progress toward maximum employment.” Thursday the BLS announced that weekly jobless claims rose to their highest level in nine months. Ouch.

Granted, the spike in jobless claims might not mean much, as they can be volatile, especially around holiday time, and indeed the four-week average of jobless claims “only” rose to its highest level in one month. Even so, the “progress toward maximum employment” has been glacial, if it can be called progress at all. The media have trumpeted the good news in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) latest employment report, which found that the standard unemployment rate fell from 7.3% to 7.0%, its lowest level in five years, and employers added 203,000 jobs. That’s fine, but it’s also just one month. Let’s look at the past year, from Nov 2012 to Nov 2013, using the Households Survey numbers in the employment report.

In the past year the adult US population grew by almost 2.4 million. The number of people “Not in labor force” (neither employed nor actively looking for a job) also grew by slightly more than 2.4 million. The total US labor force actually fell by 25,000, and the employment-to-population ratio also fell slightly, from 58.7% to 58.6%. While it’s good news that total employment rose by 1.1 million and unemployment (and people who say they currently want a job) fell by 1.1. million, the biggest growth sector by far is “Not in labor force,” again with 2.4 million. The employment/population ratio is exactly the same now as it was four years ago, in Nov 2009. This is not progress.

I wouldn’t be an economist if I never said “On the other hand,” however, and on that hand we have the “Establishments Survey” that furnishes the other half of the BLS report. The unemployment and employment/population rates come from the Households Survey; the payroll numbers (e.g., 203,000 jobs added) come from the Establishments Survey. Average monthly payroll growth for the past year was 191,000 jobs, or more than double the puny job growth in the Households Survey (1.1 million / 12 months = 92,000 jobs per month).

What would victory look like on the jobs front? I would say 5% unemployment, which the economy had for 35 straight months in the mid-2000s, or less. (And I would want the reduction to come from job growth and not from people leaving the labor force.) How far are we from 5% unemployment? The Atlanta Fed’s handy jobs calculator has the answer. If the economy keeps on adding 191,000 jobs per month, we return to 5% unemployment in three years. If it adds just 92,000 jobs per month, we never get back to 5% unemployment, unless the labor force does a whole lot of shrinking. If we split the difference and figure the correct figure is right in the middle at 141,500, then we get there in seven and a half years, in early 2021.

Back to the taper. The labor data suggest a need for more, not less, monetary stimulus, but how much stimulus were those emergency bond-buying programs providing? All we know is that they created $85 billion in new bank reserves each month. For the programs to work, banks needed to loan out those reserves. Not much of that has been happening:

Image

 

Real estate and consumer loans are flat. Business loans are rising but not fast enough to return to their trend level. (Which, by the way, is true of just about every other macro aggregate — household consumption, business investment, etc.) Just as the fastest-growing occupational category is Not In Labor Force (NILF?), the most dramatic growth on bank balance sheets is excess reserves:

Image

This is what pushing on a string looks like. Maybe the taper is causing the volume of loans, however meager, to be larger than it otherwise would be, but it’s hard to believe it’s making a world of difference. An oft-cited study published by the Brookings Institution found that the MBS purchases had managed to lower mortgage rates but that the Treasury bond purchases had not lowered long-term Treasury rates. And lowering long-term interest rates, as the bond buying is supposed to do, is only part of the game. Banks have to make loans at those rates. As we saw in the first graph, not nearly enough of that is happening. And the economy probably has to improve a lot more before banks are eager to lend and people are eager to borrow. Catch-22, yes.

All in all, the slight taper, from $85 billion to $75 billion a month, is unlikely to do noticeable harm, since the bond-buying program doesn’t seem to be making a big difference in the first place. Declaring victory, or even declaring substantial progress, on the employment front is foolish, but tapering is another story. Alternative policies, like ending the payment of interest (currently 0.25%) on bank reserves, might be preferable to the long-term bond-buying, but it’s clear from the last few years that Fed cannot be the main driver on the road to recovery. Congress could, through fiscal policy, but won’t, preferring austerity to stimulus, when it isn’t shutting down the government entirely. It looks like we’ll have to cross our fingers and hope for the “natural forces of recovery” to work their magic.

 

Companies love misery

22 October 2013

“Dow up on optimism tepid jobs report keeps Fed stimulus going”
headline, CNBC, today

In other words, a lousy labor market is good QE-bait.

Like I said before.

Impossible Germany

18 August 2013

The Eurozone has had famously high unemployment rates since the euro’s inception in 1999, and for most of that time Germany has been a key sufferer, with unemployment over 8%. Since the financial crisis broke in 2008, German economic policy has been mostly associated with austerity policies, which have predictably tended to worsen Europe’s employment situation. Yet Germany’s labor market appears to have been thriving over the past five years, with an enviable unemployment rate last month of 5.4%, second-lowest in the entire 27-country Eurozone. (Relatively tiny Austria has the lowest, 4.6%.)

eurozone-country-unemployment-rates

What accounts for the German labor market miracle? I’ve been pondering this for a while now.

First, is this miracle for real? In the US, for example, the official unemployment rate has lately been falling, yet the employment-to-population ratio has barely budged, largely because fewer people are entering the labor force (i.e., getting jobs or looking for jobs). Yet Germany’s labor force participation rate and employment-to-population ratio have been increasing. Has Germany suddenly changed its definitions of who is unemployed or not in the labor force? Apparently not, and it wouldn’t matter anyway, as these numbers are the International Labor Organization definitions of unemployment, the same as the US uses. Also, this is a fairly long-term pattern, back to 2005 (coincident with, though not necessarily caused by, Angela Merkel’s term as Chancellor following the 2005 elections).

On the other hand, perhaps Germany’s official count of the employed, like the US’s, includes a lot of part-time workers who want full-time work but cannot find it because of bad economic conditions. Indeed, The Telegraph reports:

nearly one-in-five German workers is in a tax-exempt mini-job, earning €450 a month or less. A government survey a few years ago found that nearly a third of mini-jobs workers were looking for a job with longer hours but were unable to find one.

Let’s do the math. <20% * <(1/3) = employment rate of 94.6%. Subtract 6% of 94.6%, and you’ve got 88.92%, or an unemployment rate of about 11%. This is roughly similar to the US situation, where counting involuntary part-time workers as unemployed would add 6.2 points to the unemployment rate. On the other hand, Germany’s “mini-jobs” are more a matter of government policy than their US counterparts. For more, see this Wall Street Journal article on mini-jobs, in which German experts call them dead-end jobs that provide no incentive for employers to move these workers to full-time or for the workers to give up their tax and welfare benefits for full-time work. Balance it out with this other Telegraph article that argues that mini-jobs are a helpful means of providing work.

All of this is quite different from the post I expected to write. I was going to mention how the euro’s recent weakness (for the past two years, it’s been down about 10-15% from its 2009 peak) helps Germany’s net exports. It does so both in the usual way and because Germany’s currency is surely cheaper under the euro than it would be if Germany were still on the Deutschmark. Crisis countries like Greece and Italy drag down the value of the euro, while whatever the high demand for German assets as financial safe havens does to raise the price of the euro is offset by reduced demand for other euro-country assets.

I was also going to mention Germany’s sluggish population growth and difficulty in attracting immigrants, which have caused the labor force to grow slowly. It’s easier to find jobs for a trickle of new labor force entrants than for a flood of them.

Finally, I was going to mention this 2011 National Bureau of Economic Research paper by Michael C. Burda and Jennifer Hunt, which finds the “German labor market miracle” to be real and attributes it to a hiring catch-up on the part of employers who were reluctant to hire early on in the 2000s expansion, “wage moderation” (unions accepting smaller pay increases, apparently), and “working time accounts,” seemingly similar to the “flex-time accounts” proposed by Chamber of Commerce Republicans, that allow employers to avoid paying overtime if the employee work week averages out to the standard amount. Note that the paper (or at least its abstract) does not mention “mini-jobs,” which may mean that mini-jobs are nothing new in Germany and that their use has not expanded much of late (I could not find anything much on the history of mini-jobs in my Googling).

All things considered, Germany’s labor market still looks a lot better than that of the rest of the Eurozone (except German-speaking Austria). I’d like to see a German equivalent of the comprehensive “U-6” unemployment rate that the US reports every month. My guess is that it would be very high, much like that of the US, but still showing dramatic improvement since 2005. They’re doing something right over there, but it’s hard to tell just what.

7.4%: Good news you can’t use

4 August 2013

Another first Friday, another BLS employment report, and the headline news is pretty good: In July the official unemployment rate fell to its lowest level, 7.4%, since 2008. If you were a White House publicist that morning, you could have noted that fact and also that the comprehensive U-6 unemployment rate (which includes discouraged job-seekers and involuntary part-timers) also fell, from 14.3% to 14.0%. And then you could have taken the rest of the day off.

The improvement in the U-6 unemployment rate was not enough to cancel out the previous month’s 0.5% point jump. The U-6 rate was below 14% in March, April, and May. The improvement in the official (U-3) rate was exactly counterbalanced by an 0.1% point drop in the labor force participation rate (to 63.4%). The employment/population ratio was unchanged (at 58.7% for all adults, and 75.9% for prime-age (25-54) year-old adults). The decline in participation defies easy explanation, as it involves three distinct subgroups — adult white males, white teenagers, and adult black females — but not others. (A notable recent trend, by the way, is for fewer people, especially young women, to not enter the work force.)

The unemployment rates come from the BLS’s survey of households. The BLS’s other survey, of employers (the “payroll survey”), is disappointing relative to the previous month’s. June’s report showed the economy with net job growth of 195,000, plus upward revisions of 70,000 jobs to the previous two months. July’s report has net job growth of 162,000, and downward revisions of 26,000 to the previous two months. At this month’s pace, it would take us a year longer to get back to 6% unemployment than at last month’s pace (using the handy Jobs Calculator of the Atlanta Fed).

The stock and bond markets seem to have gotten this report about right. The stock market barely budged, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate actually fell somewhat, from 2.72% to 2.60%, despite the improvement in the official unemployment rate. Both markets watch the employment reports with an eye toward the Fed’s next move on interest rates and “quantitative easing” (“QE”; special purchases of long-term bonds and mortgage-backed securities), all the more so after the Fed recently announced that it would start “tapering” off QE when unemployment falls to about 7.0% and start raising its key interest rate when unemployment falls to about 6.5%. While we’re a notch closer to those rates now, the trend does not look good. Treading water is about all this labor market is doing, and the markets seem to get that.

Employment report: Black and white is always gray

13 July 2013

Has the dust settled yet on last Friday’s BLS employment report? The big news was that the economy generated 195,000 new jobs in June, better than expected, and revised data show 70,000 more new jobs in April and May than previously reported. The basic unemployment rate was unchanged at 7.6%, but the new 265,000 jobs were enough to set the media and markets aflutter. Most articles I saw hailed the jobs news as fabulous. The S&P 500 had a good day, up 1.6%. Ten-year Treasury bond rates shot up 21 basis points (from 2.501% to 2.715%), in anticipation of higher interest rates to come, either from the natural forces of higher demand for credit in a stronger economy or from the Fed’s “tapering” its expansionary Little Depression-era policies.

The higher jobs numbers are welcome news, to be sure. Using the Atlanta Federal Reserve’s wonderful jobs calculator, at a rate of 195,000 new jobs per month, the US economy would be back to 6% unemployment by September 2015 and 5% unemployment by February 2017. Not great, but at least a visible end of the tunnel. For a long time the math was much more dismal — e.g., not until 2020. With the new revisions, the average job growth for 2012 is actually a bit better than June’s, 202,000. (Which, by the way, is better than in 2010 or 2011.) Plug that into the jobs calculator and we hit those targets three months sooner.

But that’s only half the story. The BLS employment report gives the results of two surveys: the “payrolls survey” of companies, above, and the “household survey” of individuals. Because these are two different survey populations, often the results are very different. The total number of jobs in the household survey rose by 189,000, but the number of new part-time jobs was more than twice that amount, 432,000. The difference is a whopping 243,000 drop in the number of full-time jobs. Ouch. The number of people working part-time because of “slack work or business conditions” rose by 352,000; the only good news here is that the number of people working part-time because they could not find full-time worked dropped a bit, by 69,000. (Hat tip: Paul Solman. The payrolls survey, by the way, does not distinguish between full- and part-time work, though it shows no change in average weekly hours, which implies no big change.)

This shift from full-time to part-time work may reflect a trend of employers’ increased preferences for part-time over full-time workers; for example, in the wholesale and retail trade sector, since 2006 full-time employment is down 500,000 while part-time jobs are up 1,000,000. Avoiding the “Obamacare” employer mandate for firms with 50+ workers would be another logical reason, and I wonder if this trend is a reason for the administration’s recently announced one-year delay of the mandate. But neither of these trends is new, so I don’t know why June would have seen such a particularly huge shift to part-time.

We see the same pattern in my favorite alternative unemployment rate, the U-6 unemployment rate, which includes part-time workers who would prefer full-time work and “discouraged workers” who want a job but have given up looking. Unlike the standard unemployment rate, which stayed at 7.6%, this comprehensive jobless shot up from 13.8% to 14.3%. Part of the rise was due to more discouraged workers, but most of it was from an increase in involuntary part-timers.

Overall, not a great employment report. It’s possible the household survey, which economists tend to regard as less reliable than the payrolls survey (even though it’s the one we use to derive the all-important unemployment rate), was just weird this month. For the past 12 months as a whole, we do not observe a shift from full-time to part-time work. The net increase in jobs was 2.4 million, and slightly under 10% of that was part-time jobs, about the same as for the labor force as a whole (i.e., including old and new jobs).

The bond market may have taken a while to digest the ambiguous nature of this report, as long-term Treasury yields, after rising sharply on the Friday of the report, lost half of that increase in the next week. The stock market continued to boom, perhaps because they see the rise in part-time employment as promising greater flexibility and profitability on the part of corporations. But of course these prices change for a lot of reasons.

 

This just in: College is costly

26 June 2013

 

Don’t worry, it’s still worth it, in a big way, at least on average. But that’s another story. This chart here has some interesting stories to tell:

Image

(1) The big difference between average published tuition (“sticker price”) and net tuition at public four-year colleges is a big surprise to me. I teach at a four-year public college, and I don’t think we offer big tuition scholarships to all that many people. I know that some of the flagship state universities do, and those schools also have a lot more people paying high out-of-state tuition, which surely explains some of the gap. But a difference of more than a half? I would not have guessed.

— Side note: My students would no doubt point out that this chart includes only tuition and not room/board/etc., which cost a lot more than tuition at ours and many state colleges.

(2) The average net tuition paid at four-year public colleges has doubled in real (inflation-adjusted) terms in just ten years! That’s a big jump. Parents and younger siblings cannot be pleased about this.

(3) The average net tuition at private colleges is well under half the sticker price, but it’s still steep: $52,000 for four years, more if you figure that tuition inflation will continue.

(4) State schools have lost about half their relative (tuition) cost advantage to private colleges, and state school tuition is about one-fifth of private college tuition. I’m not sure which of those statistics is more significant. Overall, assuming the quality difference between public and private schools has not changed, the first point means state schools are only half as good a deal (ignoring non-tuition fee) as they used to be. But how many private colleges are five times better than public colleges (taking into account consumption value, impact on future earnings, impact on future quality of life)? Okay, throw in room, board, etc. and they are about $10.000 at both private and public, and now it’s a $12,500 net cost at public school vs. $23.000 at private school, so now the private school costs “only” 84% more. Still a big difference.

It seems the burden of proof is on private colleges to justify their huge extra cost. Depending on the college and the applicant, some are probably worth it and some aren’t. (I remember a bright student awhile back who said his father told him, “I’m not going to pay through the nose for four years just so you can screw around.”) Prospective applicants to pricey private colleges have some justifying of their own to do (hint, hint).

Something to sneeze at (the new employment report)

4 May 2013

Friday’s big economic headline was that the unemployment rate fell to 7.5%, the lowest since 2008. And payroll employment rose by 165,000, somewhat better than expected.  The news was good enough to push the Dow Jones average over 15,000 for the first time, and it obviously could have been worse, but what an age of diminished expectations we are in. Almost four years since the 2007-2009 recession officially ended, and we’re at 7.5% unemployment. The comprehensive “U-6” unemployment rate, which includes all discouraged job-seekers and part-timers who want to work full time, actually edged up slightly to 13.9%. And the employment-to-population ratio was essentially unchanged at 58.5%. All not good.

As for the why and what do we do now, Jared Bernstein nails it a lot better than I could.